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Rapid growth of resources and escalating cost of infrastructure is leading organiza-
tions to adopt cloud computing. Cloud computing provides high performance, efficient 
utilization, and on-demand availability of resources. However, the cloud environment is 
vulnerable to different kinds of intrusion attacks which involve installing malicious soft- 
ware and creating backdoors. In a cloud environment, where businesses have hosted im-
portant and critical data, the security of underlying technologies becomes crucial. To 
mitigate the threat to cloud environments, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are a layer 
of defense. The aim of this survey paper is to review IDS techniques proposed for the 
cloud. To achieve this objective, the first step is defining the limitations and unique 
characteristics of each technique. The second step is establishing the criteria to evaluate 
IDS architectures. In this paper, the criteria used is derived from basic characteristics of 
cloud. Next step is a comparative analysis of various existing intrusion detection tech-
niques against the criteria. The last step is on the discussion of drawbacks and open is-
sues, comprehended from the evaluation, due to which implementation of IDS in cloud 
environment face hurdles.      
 
Keywords: intrusion detection systems, cyber-security, cloud computing, comparative 
analysis, open issues 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Cloud computing is an emerging technology adopted by organizations of all scale 
due to its low-cost and pay-as-you-go structure. It has revolutionized the IT world with 
its unique and ubiquitous capabilities. Organization prefers cloud as it replaces the high 
price infrastructure and need of maintenance. It offers three service models of software 
as a service (e.g. Google Apps [1]), platform as a service (e.g. Google App Engine [2], 
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Microsoft’s Azure [3]) and infrastructure as a service (e.g. Amazon Web Service [4], 
Eucalyptus [5], Open Nebula [6]). Virtualization enables cloud to provide elasticity, ease 
of use, scalability and on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable com-
puting resources [7]. Cloud computing paradigm has a service-oriented architecture 
which has led to a drastic alteration on how services are provided and managed.  
Intrusion detection techniques are used in any computing environment as a layer of 
defense. The basic aim is to detect any malicious activity well before any significant 
harm is possible. The general idea is to detect and identify attacks by either analyzing 
system artifacts (such as log files, process lists, etc.), or by keeping track of network 
traffic. Two main approaches used are signature based detection and anomaly-based de-
tection. Signature based detection works by defining patterns of known attack signatures. 
If the system is found to be processing any code similar to those signatures, it is detected 
suspicious and marked as an intrusion. On the other hand, anomaly based detection 
works by analyzing activities performed on the system. Initially, a profile for a particular 
system is created by recording normal activities (e.g., by setting thresholds for normal 
bandwidth usage). If later on, the system's behavior is analyzed as anomalous to the pro-
file defined, it is marked as an intrusion. Whereas signature-based detection techniques 
(also called misuse pattern matching) cannot detect unknown attacks, anomaly based 
techniques usually result in huge false positives or negatives. 
The distributed nature of cloud environment makes it most vulnerable and attractive 
environment for the intruders to perform attacks. Intrusion detection systems can be used 
to enhance the security of such systems by systematically examining the logs, network 
traffic as well as configurations. However conventional intrusion detection systems 
(IDSs)  which can be classified into host-based intrusion detection systems (HIDS) and 
network-based intrusion detection systems (NIDS)  are not appropriate for cloud envi-
ronment as these are unable to locate the hidden attack trail, e.g., the network-based IDS 
is unable to detect any event in case of encrypted node communication and it is possible 
for the attacker to gain control over the installed virtual machines if the hypervisor is 
compromised. Some of the popular attacks on virtual machine include DKSM [8], Sub-
Virt [9], and Bluepill [10]. Attackers can use the compromised hypervisor to gain control 
over the host. Owing to the fact that the IDS techniques were not designed with the spe-
cific context of virtualization under consideration, they do not offer the same protection 
in such environments. There are certain trade-offs that need to be faced when deploying 
IDS in the virtual environment, mostly because of their inability to inspect the internal 
working of the operating systems. Despite the huge benefits that are offered by virtual-
ization, there are a number of security risks that are associated with it. It introduces a 
number of new problems that did not exist in a traditional computing environment.  
Cloud computing providers are adopting software-defined networking (SDN) to 
achieve on-demand provisioning of network services, since SDN can provide a central-
ized system to manage the network. The network administrator is empowered by SDN to 
easily access and manage individual flows by facilitating them to implement monitoring 
applications, i.e., firewall and IDS. Furthermore, scalable monitoring and dynamic re-
configuration requirements of the network in cloud makes SDN a perfect choice. 
This paper analyzes various IDS techniques proposed in literature on the basis of a 
set of requirements (essentially drawing from the list of requirements articulated by Patel 
et al. [11], and supplemented by an additional postulate that we propose). The concept of 
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deploying SDN in the cloud was not implemented at the time Patel et al. proposed the 
list. Although the implementation of SDN in cloud environment is in its initial phases, 
but the cloud vendors have started to adopt SDN to achieve their networking require-
ments. The additional requirement, which we have placed for analysis, is the effective 
working of IDS in a SDN-based cloud environment. Finally, we have discussed virtual 
machine introspection (VMI) based techniques in detail.   
A few number of survey papers targeting this domain already exist. However, most 
of these survey papers are outdated or stinting in their coverage on cloud-based IDS.  
Zbakh et al. [12] proposed a multi-criteria analysis and a comparative study of several 
IDS architectures designed to work in cloud computing. It is the only research paper that 
uses a multi-criteria decision analysis  which the authors have named MacBeth (Meas-
uring Attractiveness by a Categorical Based Evaluation Technique)  to evaluate IDS 
architectures in cloud. Modi et al. [13] and Mehmood et al. [14] have surveyed different 
intrusions in cloud computing which affects the confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
(CIA triad) of cloud environment. An analysis of IDS and intrusion prevention system 
(IPS) techniques is performed. Furthermore, Modi et al. emphasize that in order to reach 
the desired security level, deployment position of IDS is crucial. Oktay et al. [15] enlist 
the attack types in cloud followed by details of IDS models to resist them. Patel et al. [11] 
and Premathilaka et al. [16] stress on designing IDS especially for cloud environment 
keeping in mind its paradigm after conducting a review and highlighting how traditional 
IDS fail to deliver. Moreover, Patel et al. provide us a list of requirements derived from 
the characteristics of cloud computing systems proposed by NIST [7] in order to analyze 
cloud-based intrusion detection or prevention system; techniques till mid-2012 have been 
discussed and comparatively analyzed. A tabulated summary, which presents the com-
parison of this survey paper with the existing surveys in literature, is given in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Coverage of various topics in the existing surveys. 
Survey Performance evaluation 
Advantages & 
disadvantages 
of each approach 
Intrusions in 
clouds Open issues 
[13]     
[14]     
[16]     
[11]     
[15]     
[12]     
This Research 
Paper 
  
(comparatively 
analyzed) 
   
 
In this paper, we have discussed in particular the gaps which require further study 
and have provided a comprehensive and contemporary review of various IDS techniques. 
Furthermore, prospective areas of studies have been discussed which require attention of 
the researchers in order to improve the implementation of current IDSs in cloud envi-
ronment. 
The paper is organized as follow. Section 2 highlights the various intrusion/attacks 
in cloud. In section 3, summary of the existing techniques for IDSs in the cloud is pre- 
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sented. The comparative performance analysis of all these IDS techniques is presented in 
section 4. In section 5, the common hurdles faced during the deployment of a cloud IDS 
are pointed out, and various open research issues are highlighted. Finally, we conclude 
our work and give directions for further study in section 6. 
2. INTRUSIONS IN CLOUD 
An attempt to compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of a system 
or network is known as an intrusion. In this section important classes of intrusion that 
commonly affect the cloud are described. This is followed by a presentation of various 
attacks in the cloud, classified with respect to cloud’s deployment model. 
 
2.1 Denial of Service (DoS) Attack 
 
The hacker uses bots (zombies) for flooding a system with a large number of pack-
ets to render the available resources unreachable. Subsequently, the services for the time 
being are not available on the Internet. According to some vulnerability experts, an 
attacker can affect more users by launching a DoS attack on cloud [17].   
 
2.2 Insider Attack 
 
Insider is defined as a former or current employee/associate of the cloud service 
provider which has privileged access and authority to perform modifications in the cloud 
environment [18]. Insider attacks are organized as they have information about the user 
and provider. This is fatal as many attacks can be executed from inside and an intruder 
can easily evade detection in the absence of proper controllers [19, 20]. A DoS attack by 
an insider was launched on Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) [21], cloud consum-
ers’ confidentiality was breached in this attack. 
 
2.3 User to Root (U2R) Attack 
 
In this attack, the intruder accesses the credentials of an authentic user and then ex-
ploit the system vulnerabilities (buffer overflow) to access root privileges. In the cloud, the 
attacker first accesses an instance and exploits its vulnerabilities to achieve root privileges 
of a virtual machine or host. By this attack, integrity of the cloud is being violated [13]. 
 
2.4 Port Scanning 
 
Port scanning is used by the attacker to obtain information about open, closed, fil-
tered, and unfiltered ports [13]. The attacker then uses this information to launch attacks 
on open ports. Different techniques are used in order to perform port scanning. This 
attack targets the confidentiality and integrity of the cloud.  
 
2.5 Attacks on Virtualization 
 
If an attacker compromises the hypervisor, the virtual machines can be easily infil-
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trated [13]. The best option to capture virtual machines via hypervisor is to exploit a ze-
ro-day vulnerability. Zero-day attacks are exploitation of vulnerabilities for which sys-
tem administrator or developer has not applied the patch. Since many virtual machines 
use the same resources, i.e. hardware, side channel data is vulnerable due to this type of 
access among virtual machines [22].       
 
2.6 Backdoor Channel Attack 
 
This is a passive attack in which a node in cloud is compromised and in future the 
node is used as a bot to carry out attacks like DDoS attack. The system is compromised 
by shellcode, Trojan, and other similar exploitations. After the node is compromised the 
intruder has full access to the system and data available [13].   
In Fig. 1, intrusions have been identified and classified on the basis of deployment 
model (SaaS, PaaS and IaaS). 
 
 
Fig. 1. Types of security attacks in cloud on the basis of deployment model. 
3. STATE OF THE ART IDS ARCHITECTURES IN CLOUD 
As mentioned in Section 1, conventional IDS i.e. HIDS and NIDS are not suited for 
virtual systems. The emerging threats to cloud security have led researchers to contribute 
a reasonable amount of work in the field of cloud-based IDS. In this paper, the architec-
tures are divided and covered on the basis of deployment of IDS in cloud, i.e., HIDS, 
NIDS, DIDS, and VMI Techniques, as shown in Fig. 2. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Types of Cloud-Based IDS. 
 
All of these deployment models can use anomaly detection or signature detection 
techniques. This section covers a survey of all these IDSs suited for the cloud.  
 
3.1 Host Intrusion Detection Systems 
 
HIDS techniques, with respect to cloud generally, can be divided into three main 
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deployment based classifications. HIDS, inside the VM for monitoring, can be deployed 
in the host OS (where it can monitor either the host OS or the guest OS via communica-
tion through the VMM [23]) or in a separate guest OS.  
The first scenario, in which the IDS would be completely under the control of the 
customer, has the drawback of low attack resistance. It has been overwhelmingly reject-
ed in the literature and hence marked unsuitable for the virtual cloud [24]. Laureano et al. 
[23] describe this as VMIs suited for type I or type II environment  where a type I en-
vironment implies that the VMM is the only process running on the host and several 
VMs run over it. A type II environment, on the other hand, implies that the VMM runs as 
the software on the host machine. Normal host processes as well as VMM (over which 
the VM) run on the host machine. 
Patel et al. [25] propose an autonomic agent-based intrusion prevention using the 
principles of automatic computing. Anomaly based detection technique is used to moni-
tor the system activities and network traffic via autonomous sensors for detection of ma-
licious incidents. Lee et al. [26] propose a technique that detects suspicious behavior of 
an intrusion by anomaly level of resource utilization by the user. The main module of the 
technique is authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA) component. The 
anomaly level is based on recent usage history of the user and stored in the database. IDS 
of medium level and low-level security utilizes fewer resources so more guest OS can be 
added without worrying about detection speed. The log files are available for the admin-
istrator for auditing.  
Vieira et al. [27] propose an intrusion detection system for grid and cloud compu-
ting (GCCIDS). It is a combination of behavior based and knowledge based techniques 
at middleware layer to detect intrusions. It works in a cooperative manner where each 
node can detect intrusion and generate alerts for other nodes as well. Dhage et al. [28] 
propose that an IDS controller should install an IDS instance between cloud service pro-
vider (CSP) and user until the user is accessing cloud services. IDS controller collects 
the log files from all the IDS instances running. The log files help the controller maintain 
a knowledge-based for all the users based on their activities. It also helps IDS identify 
the user next time he/she logins. The drawback of knowledge based IDS is that it can 
only update new samples by the neural network so a workaround is proposed.  
In Table 2 we have presented the characteristics and limitations of host-based IDS 
discussed above, such that these security challenges can be addressed before a standard 
technique is recommended for cloud. The ideal performance vs efficiency trade-off in 
host-IDS has not been achieved so far.   
 
Table 2. Analysis of HIDS in cloud. 
Research Deployment Technique Characteristic Limitation 
[25] Not specified 
Anomaly based
Detection
System activities (system 
calls etc.), Network traffic.
No implementation 
details 
[26] At each guest OS 
Anomaly based
Detection
User profiles,
detect known attacks
High-level users consume 
more resources 
[27] At each node Hybrid Log files for auditing, user profiles 
Accurate detection 
requires more time for 
training, number of rules 
is limited. 
[28] At each node Hybrid User activities logs, Can detect known attacks only
Experimental results are 
not given 
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Table 3. Analysis of NIDS in cloud. 
Research Deployment Technique Characteristic Limitation 
[34] Inside MVM1 Signature based Detection 
Can detect known 
attacks only 
Multiple sensors, correlating 
their data can impact perfor-
mance 
[30] vSwitch Signature based Detection 
SNORT for 
detecting DoS 
attacks 
Can detect known attacks only, 
no support for large networks, 
misconfigurations in IDS will 
miss attacks [26] 
[33] PVM 
Anomaly and Sig-
nature based 
Detection 
Separate profile
to increase 
efficiency 
No prototype 
[32] At each node Signature based Detection 
Can detect known 
attacks only 
Unable to detect  
unknown attacks 
 
The technique presented in [23] is an example of the second scenario, where the 
HIDS runs as a host process but monitors the guest OS. However, this can also be classi-
fied as an HIDS-based VMI IDS and hence we discuss it later on in this section under 
the said category. 
Similarly, the technique presented in [29] is an example of the third scenario. We 
will discuss this too under VMI-IDS. 
 
3.2 Network Intrusion Detection Systems 
 
Bakshi et al. [30] propose a typical NIDS for virtualized environments for the de-
tection of DDoS attacks. A NIDS is installed on a virtual switch (through which traffic 
of all VMs collectively passes). This is analogous to a NIDS being placed at the bound-
ary server in a traditional computing environment. The technique is very much similar to 
a traditional NIDS. However, the authors have tailored it suitable for the virtualized en-
vironment and tested it as such. 
The NIDS on vSwitch collects inbound and outbound traffic from all VMs and logs 
it. It uses SNORT [31] tools to detect DoS or DDoS attack. Traffic is analyzed based on 
the originating IP address. Any IP address detected to send huge amount of abnormal 
traffic is blocked and the targeted application is moved to a different data center. The 
technique is capable of detecting DDoS attacks as well and blocking complete botnets. 
However, no performance results are discussed in the paper and the usage of SNORT for 
detection means that only known attacks are detectable [13]. Support for large virtual 
networks where traffic volume is quite huge is not discussed in this paper [16]. NIDS is 
going to face issues processing all packets in large virtual network and it may fail to de-
tect attacks in time.  
Mazzariello et al. [32] have simulated IDS at different locations in cloud to detect 
DoS attacks on virtual SIP-based hosts. It is a signature based detection technique. The 
Eucalyptus cloud computing environment has been used for experimentation and 
SNORT has been selected as the network IDS. Gupta et al. [33] address main limitations 
in previous techniques and propose a technique catering for those. The complexity in-
troduced as a result of inspecting all VMs for all attacks. In their paper, they claim to 
1 MVM=Monitored VM; PVM= Privileged 
 
A. RIAZ, H. F. AHMAD, A. K. KIANI, J. QADIR, R. U. RASOOL AND U. YOUNIS 
 
 
 
618
 
mitigate this problem by introducing profile-based IDS. They propose an NIDS-based 
VMI for the cloud whereby a separate profile is created for each VM based on compari-
son with known attack signatures and deviation from normal thresholds.  
The characteristics and limitations of network-based IDS have been enlisted in Ta-
ble 3. The conclusion reached from the analysis is that the fast detection is a hurdle in 
network-based IDS. Furthermore, detection of unknown attacks is an issue since it fur-
ther degrades the speed of the network.   
 
3.3 Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI) Based Techniques 
 
Virtual machine introspection (VMI) is the main idea behind out-of-box intrusion 
detection. VMI is a technique of inspecting VM state by moving the inspection module 
outside of the VM. The software running inside the guest system is analyzed externally 
to detect any intrusion. One advantage of this technique is that malware detection con-
tinues to work unaffectedly even in the presence of an intrusion. This capability is miss-
ing in HIDS and NIDS. In the case of a compromise, HIDS starts reporting falsely while 
NIDS has limited visibility [29]. Recently, the works of Garfinkel et al. [29], Jiang et al. 
[35], Laureano et al. [23], and Payne et al. [36] have demonstrated the use of VMI-based 
intrusion detection techniques. We discuss these techniques next. 
Garfinkel et al. [29] propose Livewire, a prototype based on VMI for intrusion de-
tection. This technique is based on the assumption that the VMM is simple and imple-
mented correctly. This feature marks VMM safe and difficult for the attacker to com-
promise. The technique particularly leverages three properties of VMM, which are isola-
tion, inspection, and interposition. The shortcoming in the research which demands fur-
ther improvement is that the OS library interface in Livewire is required to be made in a 
safe programming language for different OSs to prevent an attack on itself. Livewire is 
considered to be revolutionary work in the domain of virtual machine IDS. 
Jiang et al. [35] propose VMwatcher, which is an out-of-box deployment of intru-
sion detection with improved accuracy and tamper resistance. VMwatcher assumes the 
underlying VMM to be secure. The technique is applicable on type II VMs. The best 
claimed feature of VMwatcher is its ability to remove a semantic gap2 that is bound to 
exist while gathering a view of guest OS externally. VMwatcher works on two tech-
niques: 1) non-intrusive VM introspection, and 2) guest view casting. Non-intrusive in-
trospection is same concept as VMI. Guest view casting is used to build the semantic 
view (i.e., files, processes, directories, and kernel level modules) of VM. VM raw image, 
with memory states, is acquired, and the focus is to reconstruct a high level semantic 
view. The prototype is tested for both windows and Linux environment. VMwatcher 
maintains the VM view by carefully crafting the semantic view. Moreover, the authors 
claim that VMwatcher has the capability to detect stealthy malware by comparing the 
view generated internally with the one generated externally.  
Another intrusion detection capability that is based on introspection is presented by 
Laureano et al. [23]. The technique is for type II VMs so that detection and response can 
be implemented as host system process. The interaction between a guest OS and an in-
trusion detection system takes place through a VMM. Two types of interactions are de-
fined, including: 1) monitoring, in which the guest OS data is extracted, and 2) response, 
2 Semantic gap is the difference in views between the one generated from inside the VM and other generated
from outside the VM. 
 
INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS IN CLOUD COMPUTING 
 
 
619
in which the response as a result of malware detection is generated. The assumption is 
that VMM is inaccessible to the guest system’s processes and is out of the reach of an 
attacker.  
Payne et al. [36] propose the architecture of Lares, a prototype claimed to be more 
sound than XenAccess [37] (which was also proposed by the same authors). Lares is 
unique in terms of doing active monitoring  a feature missing in the previous VMI- 
based IDS. The performance analysis presents a tradeoff between the design (security) 
and the overhead in processing the placed hooks. Tupakula et al. [38] propose a VMM- 
based technique. The main issue discussed in the paper is of VM domains (i.e. VMs 
hosted on same hypervisor in one domain). It is stated that, in a cloud, different hypervi-
sors host VMs of different consumers and different VMs of the same consumer can be 
hosted by several hypervisors within the cloud. They identify VMs allocated to the same 
consumer as one virtual domain, regardless of the hypervisor they are hosted on. Com-
munication within a virtual domain could be completely out of control of the cloud ser-
vice provider (CSP). 
In the VMI-based IDS techniques, one important assumption is made about the se-
curity of underlying layer, i.e., VMM/hypervisor is secure. The attacker might exploit a 
vulnerability in VMM and compromise guest OS kernel and finally the host kernel. In 
such a case there is a need to protect the VMM. Bharadwaja et al. [39] propose a tech-
nique that works by moving the IDS at the VMM layer to mitigate the threat. Collabra, a 
collaborative IDS, is a distributed platform based on Xen hypervisor to maintain the se-
curity of virtualized environment in cloud. Collabra is a filtering layer above hypervisor 
that performs an integrity check of the hyper call interface and works collaboratively 
with the distributed instances to detect and then prevent attacks. The objective is to pro-
tect the hyper call interface from attacks. The detection is performed based on anomaly 
detection. Collabra isolates the affected VMM from the network when an intrusion is 
detected. 
Jones et al. [40] propose Lycosid, a VMM based intrusion detection that is based on 
cross view validation principle. Stealthy rootkits have the ability to hide their presence 
for long. Lycosid collects the information from the guest OS without relying on the fact 
that VMM implements each and every detail on guest OS. The shortcoming is that it 
cannot obtain the correct process list when the system is running, since the process list is 
changing every moment (i.e., time synchronization). The key lies in taking a trusted view 
of the operating system generating implicit view that carries a greater level of details. 
Dunlap et al. [41] presented a prototype ReVirt. The problem addressed is that the log 
files might be tampered or completely removed by a skilled attacker. Thus leaving no 
way to detect what happened before and during the system compromise. ReVirt is an 
architecture that stores the log files out of the VM so that any tampering done in the VM 
does not affect the logs. 
DKSM attack [8], demonstrated through a prototype implementation, tends to sub-
vert introspection, i.e., out-of-box intrusion detection. The scheme addresses a very im-
portant assumption on which the introspection techniques, namely Livewire and VM- 
watcher, work. As mentioned above, the potential semantic gap is bridged by the intru-
sion detection techniques deployed in Livewire, VMwatcher, etc. These techniques rely 
heavily on the template to gain a low-level view of the guest OS. The low-level view 
incorporated in the data structures reveal the VM processes’ and files’ details. These data 
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structures make use of kernel data. In short, using the templates, the guest OS is relying 
on the usage of kernel data in a specific manner. If the kernel is compromised, or the 
template tampered, then the assumption that a guest OS is respecting its own kernel fails 
and the low-level view thus acquired will be incorrect. However, this attack is detectable 
in most Windows and Linux operating systems [42]. 
In Table 4, from characteristics and limitations, it can be concluded that underlying 
infrastructure (e.g. hypervisor) security is not covered by IDS. Furthermore, an attack 
launched on the hypervisor will have the capability to compromise VMs running on it.  
 
Table 4. Analysis of VMM in cloud. 
Research Deployment Technique Characteristic Limitation 
[29] Outside MVM (type I) 
Signature and 
Anomaly based 
Detection (not complex 
detection) 
Basis for all other VMI Not real time 
[35] Outside MVM (type II) 
View-comparison based 
malware detection 
Semantic reconstruction, live 
monitoring without affecting 
VMM, support for multiple 
VMM 
Does not mitigate zero-day 
threats [26], attacks on hyper-
visor can compromise approach 
[26], timing problem in recon-
structing views 
[23] Outside MVM (type II) 
Anomaly based 
Detection 
System activities (system calls 
etc.), Network traffic. 
Monitoring code inside VMM, 
VMM code modified 
[36] PVM 
Security VM  depends 
on API (anti-virus) used 
by end user 
Hooks and trampoline func-
tion inside VMM 
VMM Code modified, hooks 
and trampoline bottleneck [18] 
[41] Inside/outside VMM Analyzing logs Secure logging 
No malware detection [26], time 
to analyze, record and replay 
logs 
[39] VMM Anomaly based Detection 
Detects hyper-call based 
attacks targeting 
the VMM 
Cannot detect other attacks [22] 
[40] VMM View comparison based malware detection
Can detect and identify root-
kits efficiently 
Timing problem in reconstruct-
ing views, cannot detect idle 
hidden process, only for rootkits 
 
3.4 Distributed Intrusion Detection Systems  
 
To counter DoS and DDoS attacks in cloud, Lo et al. [43] have proposed and simu-
lated an intrusion detection system. The IDS has four components each playing a specific 
role. This protects the system from a single point of failure. However, it uses 
signature-based detection technique due to which unknown attacks are not detected. He 
et al. [44] propose a 3-D IDS architecture. It is a distributed IDS for the users of IaaS in 
cloud. 3-D IDS is composed of a server and multiple agents. The architecture is a theo-
retical model and no experimental evidence is presented in the paper. Moreover, the ar-
chitecture requires the deployment of the server at user end which is not always neces-
sarily deployed at all users.  
Shelke et al. [45] propose a solution for Cross Site Scripting (XXS) and DDoS at-
tacks using a multi-threaded network intrusion detection system. The method consists of 
three modules namely capture module, analysis and processing module, and finally the 
reporting module. It is a novel approach but the researcher has not provided evidence to 
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prove the concept. Siren [46] is another VM-based intrusion detection system. Siren 
works by detecting malicious software running in the VM that attempt to send infor-
mation over the network of which the VM is part of. Siren works on the principle that 
there should be no traffic generated by VM on the network in the absence of human in-
put. If such a state is detected, then Siren flags the traffic as malicious. One of the best 
features of Siren is its ability to inject crafted human input to investigate for the ad-on 
malware. The technique seems promising however the real challenge lies with generating 
traffic that resembles closely with the human input. 
Dastjerdi et al. [47] propose another DIDS based on static and mobile agents. They 
have modified the DIDMA [48] approach for a DIDS to work in the virtual cloud envi-
ronments. Dastjerdi et al. mention that their technique reduces network load for less than 
six VMs in a network. Each mobile agent only analyses a small amount of code. Howev-
er, if this limit is exceeded, the network loads gets heavier [13, 14]. Roschke et al. in [34] 
propose IDS which they deploy on each virtual machine. They mention that this IDS can 
be either HIDS or NIDS based on the type of sensors deployed and hence the type of 
data monitored. The drawback of this technique is that it uses multiple IDS sensors and 
each sensor is deployed on the virtual machine. Ibrahim et al. [42] propose a technique 
that uses VMware specially built APIs to carry out VM introspection. Their architecture 
has two main modules VMI back-end and CloudSec. The authors claim that their tech-
nique supports real-time monitoring while bridging the semantic gap. They tested their 
prototype and found minor overheads. 
The characteristics and limitations highlighted in Table 5 help us to reach the con-
clusion that the distributed IDS limits the number of VMs. Furthermore, attention should 
be provided to reduce computational overhead.    
 
Table 5. Analysis of DIDS in cloud. 
Research Deployment Technique Characteristic Limitation 
[47] MVM 
Anomaly and  
Signature based 
Detection 
Works even if 
VM migrated, can detect 
known and zero-day attacks
Limited number of VM can be 
visited, performance overhead 
for malicious MA 
[42] 
One module 
inside VMM, 
one external 
Anomaly 
based 
Detection 
Low overheads, 
semantic 
reconstruction 
Execution suspended in case of 
event, no defense mechanism, 
rootkits only 
[44] 
Major module 
(agent) is depl- 
oyed inside VM 
Signature, anomaly, 
vertical & horizontal 
fusion analysis 
Integrates HIDS, NIDS tech-
niques, correlates VM data
 
No prototype 
[43] Every single cloud region 
Signature based 
Detection 
Can detect from signatures 
of known attacks 
High computation overhead and 
unable to detect unknown attacks 
[45] Processing Server Hybrid 
Signature based, log files 
for auditing, user profiles. No implementation 
4. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF EXISTING CLOUD BASED IDS 
Different approaches for cloud intrusion detection have been discussed in the above 
section, each one addressing somewhat unique research gaps. However, each technique 
has its own strengths and limitations as well. A HIDS deployed on a virtual machine 
comes with the inherent flaw of low attack resistance [23]. It provides good visibility 
into the system, however, a HIDS on the host system does not cater virtual machines. It 
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would only act as traditional HIDS monitoring the host system itself. Such a technique in 
conjunction with other techniques (e.g., VMI-based) can prove to be efficient in securing 
the host system itself.  
A NIDS can be deployed on each virtual machine. However, the most widely used 
technique is that of deploying a NIDS on a virtual switch. Such a technique costs a lot of 
computational overhead as one component has to cater the burden of all traffic and seg-
regate it as well. In high-traffic environments, the IDS might fail due to this complexity 
and render all detection results unreliable. If the only route for all traffic gets suspended 
due to this reason, it may even result in a severe DoS attack until the NIDS is restarted 
[29]. Additionally, a NIDS has low visibility into the VM and would not be able to detect 
attacks occurring internally inside the hypervisor [13]. A NIDS is incapable of analyzing 
any encrypted traffic as well. However, on the brighter side a NIDS has high attack re-
sistance [23]. 
VMI or VMM based techniques assume that the hypervisor remains secure and non- 
malicious. However, this is a widely accepted assumption as the code for VMM is small 
and hence less prone to contain bugs [38]. Modi et al. in [13] mention that generally a 
vSwitch and hypervisor are part of the Trusted Cloud Base. The reasons that they men-
tion are as following:  
1. The code is small and less prone to bugs. 
2. Their security can be strengthened further by use of a Trusted Platform Module (TPM).  
3. They are under full control of the cloud service provider. 
Wang et al. in [49], however, argue that many VMMs do have a large code base so 
this is not always an applicable assumption. They state that from 2007 to 2010, National 
Vulnerability Database (NVD) recorded 26 vulnerabilities in Xen Hypervisor and 18 in 
VMware. 
When compared with NIDS, VMI techniques provide better visibility into the sys-
tem and solve the problem of attacker manipulation as well. As long as the kernel data 
structures are intact, a hypervisor-level IDS will continue its operation in a reliable man-
ner even if the guest OS has been compromised. The performance of VMI/VMM based 
techniques also depend on the fact that the VMI remains hidden from the attacker. Gar-
finkel et al. in [29] mention that it is almost impossible to hide the presence of a VMM 
due to the difference in execution of instructions and operations. This is a performance 
reduction factor for VMI techniques in general. 
The problem of semantic gap has also been discussed in the literature [50]. From 
outside the guest OS, a VMI technique gathers the hardware level view of the VM. This 
means decreasing the visibility as compared to in-guest IDS. Using knowledge about the 
kernel data structures and OS algorithms, these techniques attempt to build a high-level 
view of the system. However, this means bringing some pause in detection. 
In other solutions, where some monitoring code is deployed inside the guest OS, 
real-time monitoring is provided. The monitoring code helps gather high-level view of 
the virtual machine. However, this technique brings with its own limitations. The pres-
ence of monitoring code can affect the deployed code and make it behave differently 
[50]. Besides, if it is deployed inside the guest OS, it could mean that the code gets oper-
ational only after the guest OS is booted and gets switched off before the guest OS has 
completely shut down [50]. The monitoring code also increases the computational load 
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of the guest OS itself. Additionally, the guest OS needs to be suspended for analysis 
when this technique is used [29, 42]. 
For CloudSec implementation, Ibrahim et al. [42] claim that their technique sup-
ports real-time monitoring while bridging the semantic gap. Some instruction suspension 
is however still present in this technique. When the back-end module passes any memory 
page to the Semantic Gap Bridge (SGB) for analysis, VM operations are suspended to 
keep the monitoring real-time. 
VMI techniques are very complex in nature. Detailed and up-to-date information 
about the internal workings of the specific operating system is required. Although this is 
a complicated process even for an open-source system, closed-source systems would 
require a considerable amount of reverse engineering as well [51]. Moreover, any system 
update or installed patch would mean that the complete data gets changes hence leaving 
the introspection tool invalid [51].  
Dolan-Gavitt et al. in [51] present “Virtuoso” a technique to automatically generate 
introspection tool in three phases. In the first (training) phase, a code snippet inside the 
operating system records all OS related information to be used by the tool. The second 
phase (analysis) extracts security related information for this or information specifically 
needed for introspection. The information is then used to generate an introspection pro-
gram that can run outside the guest OS, specifically a runtime environment provided by 
phase 3. The timing problem in reconstructing semantic views is mentioned as a limita-
tion for the technique given in [35]. This is because the IDS uses comparison-based ap-
proach to detect attacks. There would always be some difference between views taken 
from guest OS and VMM if they are not exactly synchronized. This can lead to lots of 
false negatives [52]. When VMM code is modified, it is mentioned as a limitation be-
cause all VMI-based techniques depend on the assumption that VMM is from the trusted 
code base. Any changes to its code can lead to significant bugs and hence pave the way 
for possible attacks. 
Payne et al. argue in [36] that the hook and the trampoline function are security bot-
tlenecks [50]. Although the authors state that the code for these functions is very small 
and contained, and hence reliable, it is evident that the code still resides inside the moni-
tored VM and hence is subject to attacks. In [41], the authors use logging functionality as 
the basis for detecting attacks. The tool can be deployed inside or outside the VM. If 
deployed inside the VM, it would not be resistant to attacks. The timing overhead in-
curred during recording, replaying, and analyzing the attacks is a limitation. The mali-
cious entity can cause significant damage before the IDS is able to detect an attack. 
The DIDS technique used in [47] mentions virtualization as a way of dealing with 
malicious mobile agents. However, for the virtual cloud, mobile agents are deployed 
inside monitored VM. The performance impact that would occur as a result of shifting 
their position to another VM has not been discussed. It could pose significant overheads 
and has hence been mentioned as a limitation. 
Patel et al. [11] mention eight performance requirements for any IDS techniques 
generally used in the cloud. We have used six of these requirements as another way of 
evaluating the techniques surveyed in this paper. The analysis is presented in Table 7. A 
noteworthy point is that the evaluation here is a comparison based, i.e., during analysis a 
technique is analyzed whether it is fast when compared to other techniques. A brief de-
scription is provided in Table 6.  
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Table 6. Performance requirements for any IDS technique [11]. 
Criteria Description 
Detect in large, distributed, 
and multi-tiered environment 
(R1) 
The nodes are created, updated, and deleted at runtime in the cloud. IDS 
should be capable of managing with minimum or no human interaction. 
Detect variety of attacks 
(R2) 
Wherever signature based techniques are used, detecting a variety of attacks 
is not possible, hence, the field has been marked in negative. 
Fast Detection 
(R3) 
NIDS techniques are not fast in general since they have to analyze data from 
a lot of sources. The field has been marked in negative accordingly. 
Self-Adoption (R4) It should automatically adapt to the changes in cloud environment, i.e., node 
addition or removal.  
Scalable 
(R5) 
It means whether the technique can be tailored to be used for large systems 
or not. Techniques which cannot support large virtual networks have been 
marked negative. 
Real Time Monitoring 
(R6) 
VMI-based techniques are in general not real-time. However, some of the 
techniques mentioned in this paper have specifically been constructed as an 
attempt to fill this gap. 
Synchronization issues 
(R7) 
Wherever IDS is composed of multiple components or depends on real-time 
communication with any other component, synchronization can be a problem. 
Resistant to compromise 
(R8) 
Wherever the IDS depends on some component inside the VM, the tech-
nique becomes less attack resistant. 
IDS works in SDN-based 
cloud environment (R9) 
SDN consists of a centralized controller and dumb switches. We evaluate 
whether the IDS schemes proposed for traditional networking can be de-
ployed in SDN as well.  
 
Table 7. Performance analysis of existing techniques. 
Research 
Detect 
Variety of 
Attacks 
Fast 
Detection Scalable
Real Time
Monitoring
Synchroniza-
tion Issues
Resistant 
to Com- 
promise 
Works in 
SDN-based 
Cloud 
Roschke, et al. [34]       N/A 
Bakshi et al. [30]        
Garfinkel et al. [29]  N/A N/A   N/A  
Jiang et al. [35]  N/A N/A N/A  N/A N/A 
Laureano et al. [23]  N/A N/A   N/A N/A 
Payne et al. [36] N/A N/A N/A   N/A N/A 
Gupta et al. [33]   N/A    N/A 
Dunlap et al. [41]  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Bharadwaja et al. [39]  N/A N/A  N/A N/A  
Jones et al. [40]  N/A N/A  N/A N/A N/A 
Dastjerdi et al. [47] N/A N/A    N/A  
Ibrahim et al. [42]   N/A  N/A   
He et al. [44]        
Lo et al. [43]        
Mazzariello et al. [32]   N/A     
Shelke et al. [45]        
Patel et al. [25]       N/A 
Lee et al. [26]   N/A  N/A  N/A 
Vieira et al. [27]       N/A 
Dhage et al. [28]  N/A   N/A  N/A 
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In this paper we have not evaluated the IDSs’ performance on the criteria R1 and 
R4, given in Table 6, since authors discussing their techniques have not provided suffi-
cient information to evaluate them on the given parameters. 
In “Works in SDN-based Cloud environment” (R9) the requirement not applica-
ble (N/A) is selected for some techniques because the authors do not take responsibility 
for the underlying technology. They only provide IDS for the VM. In SDN network 
based DIDS techniques cannot be implemented as all traffic is monitored by the con- 
troller. 
5. COMMON CHALLENGES AND OPEN ISSUES OF IDS 
With the evolution of networks and computer infrastructure, intrusion detection 
techniques have improved with the goal of providing security and protection. Despite 
extensive research in this area, there are still open problems. Some of the most signifi-
cant challenges of implementing an intrusion detection system include low detection 
efficiency, low throughput & high cost IDS, lack of standard metrics & assessment 
methodologies and encrypted data.  
High false-positive rate results in low detection efficiency [53]. In anomaly based 
IDS less training time leads to more false positives while more training time results in 
more resource utilization. A balance between the two factors is required i.e. security and 
usability. High data rates (Gbps) in wideband technologies lead to low throughput and 
high cost IDS [54]. To overcome this problem grid computing based and distributed de-
tection techniques are proposed. Selection of IDS is a difficult process due to lack of 
standard metrics and assessment methodologies [55, 56]. According to Axelsson et al. 
report, IDS itself are attacked and no countermeasures for their protection are placed [57]. 
Ptacek et al. propose different mechanisms to secure the IDS [58]. One of the most sig-
nificant hurdle faced by IDS in every platform is encrypted data. The above-mentioned 
points should be catered for in designing and implementing an IDS.  
 
5.1 Lack of Datasets for Cloud IDS 
 
In recent years the attacks against cloud computing have evolved and it is observed 
that the lack of datasets hinders the implementation of an effective intrusion detection 
system. The current datasets used for traditional computing cannot be used due to the 
heterogeneous operating systems installed in virtual machines, diversity in user require-
ments, and the data size of cloud.  
Kholidy et al. [59] propose a cloud intrusion detection dataset (CIDD), the only da-
taset designed specifically keeping the infrastructure of cloud in mind. It consists of 
knowledge and user based audit data collected from Unix and Window users. CIDD in-
cludes audit parameters which can detect host based, network based, and masquerade 
attacks. However, the dataset still lacks sufficient amount of data for a wider detection.  
The effectiveness of an intrusion detection dataset is determined by the true and 
false positive rate. The true positive rate is determined by sending attacks to the cloud 
IDS and evaluating the number of attacks detected. False positive rate determines the 
ratio of false alert. The false positive rate of an ideal IDS will be zero, i.e., no false alert 
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is generated. Building a cloud dataset is challenging due to several major reasons high-
lighted below: 
 
1. Real-life attacks data is not available for researching solutions and models. After an 
attack data is labeled as evidence and not made public for examination by researchers. 
2. The infrastructure of a commercial cloud is difficult to be controlled by a researcher to 
build attack scenario. Furthermore, private cloud vulnerabilities are similar to conven-
tional IT infrastructure which adds to the hindrance in building attack scenarios [60]. 
3. The diversity of operating systems in VMs (e.g. Unix, Windows) makes it difficult to 
collect data from different users. 
4. The enormous size of audit data and a high number of users in cloud computing re-
quire great computing resources. 
 
5.2 How to Detect Application Level DDoS Attacks in Cloud? 
 
Application level DDoS flooding attack is one of the most dangerous types of 
DDoS attacks because they comparatively utilize less bandwidth and are stealthier than 
volumetric attack. The application level DDoS flooding attack effects the services in a 
similar manner as volumetric attack, since they target specific characteristics of an app- 
lication, e.g. HTTP, DNS. 
Research by Gartner shows an increase in the incidents initiated by application level 
DDoS flooding attacks [61]; and for their mitigation, access to information in the 
payload is required. Currently, IDS in cloud are capable enough to detect application 
layer attack, however, they cannot detect DDoS attacks which use valid packets [62]. 
Most of the attackers today use valid packets. To some extent anomaly based IDS offer 
capabilities to detect these attacks but an expert needs to manually tune it, still IDS might 
not be able to detect all the attack flows. Additionally, IDS only detects and generates an 
alarm. Using IDS as a DDoS defense platform raises a lot of issues as they will not per-
form any action to mitigate the threat [63]. A complementary mitigation strategy is re-
quired in IDS which will detect extremely sophisticated attack flow and take necessary 
steps. Signature based IDS will miss application layer DDoS attack. Sophisticated DDoS 
attacks are identified by anomalous behavior at L3 and L4, and IDS is not optimized 
enough to detect and mitigate DDoS. 
Major efforts are essential to propose a solution which is a perfect trade-off between 
performance and security.       
 
5.3 Securing SDN 
 
Software defined networking is adopted in cloud computing because it is program-
mable, easily partitionable, and virtualized. In terms of identification and response of 
attacks, SDN has two key advantages over traditional networks [64]: 1) the control plane 
allows an administrator to separate and block attack patterns simultaneously on all het-
erogeneous hardware (no need to individually reconfigure them), and 2) instead of in-
vesting in an expensive intrusion detection system, SDN can make it a distributed task 
among nodes, e.g. controller can define rules on switches to detect malicious flows.  
This also gives an opportunity to the attackers as SDN exposes new interfaces, i.e., 
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communication between the control plane and data plane. By compromising the SDN 
controller, the whole network can be compromised. Moreover, low-level network ser-
vices can also be attacked which was not possible in traditional networks. Therefore, 
while using SDN to provide IDS services, the security of SDN should be kept in mind. 
An airtight access control policy for the SDN controller is needed to be designed and 
implemented.   
   
5.4 Secure Hypervisor 
 
To the best of our knowledge, current literature on secure cloud lacks discussion on 
capabilities, limitations, and applicability of secure hypervisor. The security of cloud 
greatly depends on the hypervisor on which the virtual machines are hosted. A single 
hypervisor can host many VM at the same time. A scenario in which VM running on a 
hypervisor running multiple VMs get compromised. There is no guarantee that the in-
truder would not be able to access the hypervisor and ultimately all the VMs running on 
it. A perfectly secured VM can be violated by a compromised hypervisor. Therefore, at 
the time of service level agreement, ask the hard questions; How are VMs isolated? How 
is a security issue in hypervisor detected? What will be the response of the cloud provid-
er?  
The examples of a secure hypervisor are sHype and NoHype implementation. The 
sHype is an IBM initiated project which was initially developed for rHype, an open- 
source research hypervisor, however, it has been implemented in Xen which is an open- 
source hypervisor as well. The fundamental goal of sHype project was to control inter 
VMs information flow. The architecture of sHype is very flexible and supports a wide 
range of security policies. Nevertheless, it does not control all the information flows be-
tween the VMs, just explicit data is monitored [65]. In NoHype [66], researchers have 
removed virtualization but kept the key features of virtualization. This secures the VMs 
from attacks through a compromised hypervisor due to a malicious VM. The limitations 
of this technique are one core per VM, memory space partitioning, and virtualization of 
I/O devices at hardware level [66]. They basically limit the covert channel by one VM 
per core but research shows that there are other covert channels in the architecture [67]. 
Thus this is a weak technique.     
The use of these techniques for the purpose of securing virtual cloud in general, and 
VMI-IDS in particular can be considered in future works. 
 
5.5 VM Migration  
 
Current literature is limited on the possible impact of virtual machine migration on 
intrusion detection system in the cloud. Attackers can gain full control of a VM in the 
migration process through stack, heap or integer overflow vulnerability in the migration 
module. Additionally, without proper policies, an intruder can initiate or terminate the 
VM migration process which may result in denial of service, injection of malicious code 
during migration or gaining control of the VM during migration. Moreover, insecure 
channels used during migration also give the attacker a window to launch passive and 
active attacks [68].  
Ahmad et al. [68] have conducted a survey on different techniques that secure VM 
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migration process. For this purpose, they have highlighted the vulnerabilities, threats, 
and different possible attacks in the VM migration process. Moreover, they have identi-
fied security requirements for secure VM migration, and evaluated the existing mecha-
nisms. VM migration can have a significant impact on intrusion detection policies. The 
technique proposed by Dastjerdi et al. [47] supports VM migration but the latter's effects 
on other techniques have not been considered in this work. Future work within the same 
domain can target filling this gap as well. 
 
5.6 Effective and Efficient IDS in Cloud Architecture 
 
In the context of cloud security, the role of intrusion detection systems is vital. As 
discussed in section 3, a significant number of detection systems have been proposed, 
however, they are unable to provide complete security. To some extent hybrid detection 
technique disturbed intrusion detection system provides a secure environment but it re-
quires a trade-off with the performance. For the betterment of detection system, an algo-
rithm is required which uses minimal computing resources and provides a secure envi-
ronment. Moreover, the classifier and feature selection should also detect resource leak-
age [69].   
6. CONCLUSION 
The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of a computer system is ensured using 
IDS. Due to the exponential growth of cloud users, IDSs for cloud computing are in 
great demand. In this paper, we have discussed existing solutions for intrusion detection 
in the cloud. Cloud based IDS have been divided into four types, including: network- 
based, host-based, distribution based, and virtual machine introspection based systems. 
Their limitations and unique capabilities are mentioned and mapped on to the perfor-
mance commensurate with that required for a cloud-based IDS in general. Performance 
criteria used for evaluation is derived from the basic characteristics of a cloud and an 
additional requirement has been proposed, i.e., effective working of an intrusion detec-
tion technique in a SDN-based cloud environment. SDN capabilities include software 
based traffic analysis, global view of network, and a centralized control. However, SDN 
has its own set of security issues to the table.  
In addition to this, common pitfalls in the implementation of an IDS have been dis-
cussed. The significant issues, including lack of datasets to evaluate the performance of 
an IDS in a cloud, how to detect application level DDoS attacks in a cloud, securing 
SDN, secure hypervisor, VM migration, and effective and efficient IDS in a cloud archi-
tecture have been highlighted. In summary, a lot of efforts have been made towards se-
curing cloud using IDS, however, due to the evolving nature of cloud, i.e., scalability, 
distributed processing, big data analysis, and service oriented architecture, there is still 
room of improvement to achieve the ideal IDS.  
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